Size matters in banking. In this paper, we explore whether shocks originating at large banks affect the probability of distress of smaller banks and thus the stability of the banking system. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. In a first step, we follow Gabaix (2005) and construct a measure of idiosyncratic shocks at large banks, the so-called Granular Residual. This measure documents the importance of size effects for the German banking system. In a second step, we incorporate this measure of idiosyncratic shocks at large banks into an integrated stresstesting model for the German banking system following De Graeve et al. (2007) . We find that positive shocks at large banks reduce the probability of distress of small banks.
Motivation
Size effects matter in banking. Typically, banking systems are dominated by a small number of large, international players who are active in a large range of countries and market segments. At the same time, small and regionally focused financial institutions coexist. This dichotomous banking system structure is particularly prevalent in Germany with its numerous savings and cooperative banks and only a few large, internationally active banks. These size differences across banks can have important implications for the stability of banking systems. If one large bank is hit by an adverse shock, this may have negative repercussions on the performance of other banks in the system. 1 In this paper, we explore whether and how the size distribution of banks affects the propagation of shocks through the German banking system. We are particularly interested in the question whether idiosyncratic shocks originating at large banks affect the distress probabilities of small und mid-sized banks. Our analysis proceeds in two steps.
In a first step, we follow Gabaix (2005) and construct a so-called Granular Residual for the banking industry. Gabaix (2005) shows that idiosyncratic volatility in the sales of the largest 100 non-financial firms in the U.S. can explain a significant fraction of the volatility of U.S. output growth. In this paper, we argue that similar effects might be at work in the banking industry. The Granular Residual hypothesis rests on the assumption that firm size is power-law distributed. The notion of the existence of Power laws in 1 Greenspan (2007: 109) , for instance, describes the importance of large players in the unfolding of the stock market crash in 1987 ("Black Monday"): "Goldman Sachs was scheduled to make a $700 million payment to Continental Illinois Bank in Chicago, […] . Had Goldman withheld such a large sum, it would have set off a cascade of defaults across the market." economics dates back to Pareto (1897) . Under a Power law distribution, idiosyncratic shocks do not average out as the number of firms increases. Instead, the effects of firmlevel shocks on aggregate developments depend on the degree of concentration in an industry, as measured by the Herfindahl index. We thus compute the Granular Residual for the German banking system, and we document the importance of size effects for the whole banking sector. More specifically, we construct a measure of the shocks to growth in banks' equity for the 10 largest banks. Size is measured in terms of assets. Our results are not sensitive to the use of a specific shock or size measure though.
In a second step, we introduce the "Banking Granular Residual" into a stress-testing model for the German banking system that has recently been proposed by De Graeve et al. (2007) . Building on earlier work by Jacobson et al. (2005) , De Graeve et al. (2007) provide an integrated micro-macro stress-testing framework in which the micro-level is modeled to explain the probabilities of distress of banks. The macro-level is modeled as a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. In the time period under study (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , distress events for German banks are observed only for smaller and mid-sized banks. Hence, the model ignores the effects of events at large banks. We thus complement their approach, on the micro-side, by including the Granular Residual for large banks as an additional explanatory variable in the regression equation explaining the probability of distress of banks. On the macro-side, we estimate the VAR including and excluding the Banking Granular Residual on the micro-side and comparing the impulse responses qualitatively.
Our paper is related to two main strands of the banking literature. A first strand of research deals with contagion effects in banking. Theoretically, Allen and Gale (2000) have suggested a model how banks' liquidity shocks can become contagious. In their 4 baseline model, banks in four regions are linked through bilateral interbank assets and liabilities. Generally, 'normal' liquidity shocks can be diversified across banks and do not become contagious. However, if one bank in the system is hit by an excess liquidity shock, systemic liquidity crises may occur. This risk is particularly prevalent if banking sector linkages are incomplete and if the liquidity shock is large relative to the liquidity buffers of banks. Hence, the model shows the importance of shocks originating in large banks (or regions) to systemic stability in banking systems.
Empirical studies support the notion of contagion in the banking sector. Degryse and Nguyen (2007) look at contagion in the Belgian banking sector. In contrast to most of the earlier literature, they study contagion over time, using a dataset ranging from December 1992 until December 2002. They find that contagion risk varies over time, depending on the interbank market structure, bank capitalization, and the degree of internationalization. Bühler and Prokopczuk (2007) compare the degree of systemic risk in the banking sector with systemic risk in German as well as U.S. industry sectors. They find that systemic risk is larger for the banking sector than for industry sectors. Furthermore, they find that the German banking sector exhibits lower systemic risk than the banking sector in the U.S. These results for Germany are confirmed by Upper and Worms (2002) who look at interbank loans in Germany. They also find some evidence of contagion risk.
A second strand of research studies the importance of economies of scale and scope -and thus of size effects -in the banking industry. In an early study, Benston et al. (1983) look at a sample of U.S. banks in 1978. While they do not find evidence of economies of scale at the level of the banking firm, there is some evidence of multiproduct (ray) scale economies at the banking office (plant) level. Berger and Humphrey (1994) summarize 5 the results of previous studies on U.S. bank cost and profit functions. This literature finds scale and scope economies to be important for small banks, but not for large ones. Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) look at the banking markets in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. They find that scale economies exist in each banking market. They even find strong evidence for economies of scale in the largest banks. Regarding economies of scope, they find evidence only for the German banking market, perhaps because of its universal nature. Cavallo and Rossi (2001) , using a panel of banks and financial institutions in France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and UK over the period 1992-1997, get similar results. They find strong evidence of economies of scale and scope for most financial institutions. However, economies of scale are more pronounced for small institutions. These results are confirmed by Lang and Welzel (1996) who find moderate economies of scale for German cooperatives using data from 1989 until 1992. For the banking industry, earlier work has also documented that banks' assets follow a Power law distribution. Pushkin and Aref (2004) look at data for U.S. bank mergers from 1980-1998. They find that banks' assets follow a Power law distribution.
In the following Part Two, we summarize the argument made by Gabaix (2005) , and we document size effects in the German banking system. In Part Three, we provide estimates of the impact of the Granular Residual in banking at the micro-and the macro-level. At the micro-level, we estimate whether banks' probability of distress depends on shocks at large banks. At the macro-level, we document how idiosyncratic shocks at large banks affect macroeconomic stability through their impact on the VAR model. Part Four concludes. Overall, we find evidence for shocks at large banks to affect the probability of distress of small and mid-sized banks in Germany. Positive shocks at large banks reduce 6 smaller banks' probability of distress, while negative shocks increase this probability.
This result is robust against various modifications of our empirical model concerning the measurement of the Banking Granular Residual and the estimation method.
Size Effects and the Granular Residual in Banking
Large firm effects in the form of a Granular Residual have so far been explored for large non-financial firms. Here, we briefly outline the rational of these approaches, and we discuss how the concept can be applied to the banking industry.
The Granular Residual: The Original Idea
The original concept of the Granular Residual has been developed to analyze the impact of idiosyncratic shocks at large non-financial firms on the macro-economy. Gabaix (2005) constructs a small theoretical model of an economy which consists of N islands, each being home to one firm. In the baseline model, there are no backward and forward linkages between industries or firms. Denoting each firm's sales by , the growth rate of firm's sales can be written as:
where i σ is the volatility of firm i's sales, and
is an independent random shock variable with zero mean and variance 1. Total GDP of the economy is the sum of output across firms: , and GDP growth is given by
Under the assumption that the shocks are uncorrelated, the volatility of aggregate GDP is given by the standard deviation of growth rates:
If all firms have the same volatility, then aggregate volatility is equal to firm-level volatility, multiplied with the economy's Herfindahl index:
The impact of shocks to individual firms on aggregate outcomes depends on the size distribution of firms (Gabaix 2005) . If all firms are of equal size, the law of large numbers applies, and volatility of GDP is smaller than the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks. However, empirical firm sizes are typically not equally distributed. Instead, firm size distributions often have fat tails and follow a Power law distribution. The Power law distribution is given by for . For estimation purposes, the respective density function is used: . Taking logs, one gets
, where C is a constant. If the coefficient ς is equal to one, the distribution is called a Zipf distribution.
If indeed firm size follows a Power law distribution, idiosyncratic shocks at the firm-level can have an impact on aggregate outcomes. To show this empirically, Gabaix (2005) constructs the so-called Granular Residual, i.e. a measure of the idiosyncratic shock to 8 firm i. Subtracting the mean growth rate of firms from firm i's growth ( t it g g − ) and aggregating across the shocks to the largest 100 firms gives the Granular Residual:
Hence, the Granular Residual is the ratio between the size-weighted shocks and total sales of the largest firms in an economy. Gabaix (2005) then uses the Granular Residual to explain GDP growth in a time series regression. He finds positive and significant effects of the contemporaneous and the lagged Granular Residual, and an explanatory power of about 40% in a regression framework without additional control variables.
The Granular Residual: Application to Banking
Since earlier work has documented the presence of size effects in banking (Pushkin and Aref 2004), applying the above idea to the banking industry is a natural next step. Our application differs from the one by Gabaix (2005) . Whereas he tries to show how shocks at large firms can affect aggregated outcomes such as the volatility of GDP growth, we aim at showing how shocks at large banks affect the probability of distress at smaller banks.
The first question we address here is whether aggregated developments in the banking industry are driven by idiosyncratic shocks at large banks. The second question, to which we will turn in Section 3 below, is whether these shocks at large banks feed back into the probabilities of distress of banks at the micro-level and into the macroeconomic dynamics of an economy.
Turning to the first question of interest, the key step towards an application of the Granular Residual to banking is to find an analogy to the size, the shocks, and the sales of non-banks. In doing so, we somewhat deviate from Gabaix (2005) , who uses the sales of non-financial firms to construct these three measures. Since the banking sector is different from the non-financial sector, we proceed as follows:
Finding a proxy for bank size is relatively straightforward, since banks' assets are a standard proxy for size in the banking literature. However, the ranking of banks is relatively robust to other proxies of size like operating income or profits before tax.
Though size cannot directly be seen in equation (4), we need it to determine the largest banks in the economy.
A proxy for idiosyncratic shocks, we use the growth rate of the banks' equity. Typically, banks can be expected to hold relatively small capital buffer since equity capital is a relatively expensive source of finance. At the same time, adverse shocks to banks' assets will ultimately be reflected in the capitalization of banks. Using equity as a proxy for shocks has the additional advantage that our shock measure is not much affected by a particular business model that banks follow. Loans, for instance, would not be a good shock measure, since some banks are specialized in granting loans, while this is only a small part of their business for other banks. Similarly, the structure of deposits is likely to differ across banks. Therefore, we opt for banks' equity as a proxy for their financial condition.
There has been an intensive discussion in the banking literature on the appropriate definition of banks' outputs which can be used in an analogy to the sales of non-financial firms. This is because banks do not produce physical products, but services. These are difficult to quantify since there is no consensus in the literature on how to define output for a multi-service firm. Benston (1965 Benston ( , 1970 and Bell and Murphy (1968) propose the number of deposit accounts and loans produced as their preferred measure of output. Brigham and Pettit (1970) , Gramley (1962) , and Grebler and Brigham (1963) opt for total assets, whereas Alhadeff (1954) , Horvitz (1963) , and Schweiger and McGee (1961) Benston (1972) .) What we need here is a proxy for banks' sales which is (i) relatively easy to compute and that does not suffer from potentially large measurement errors, and (ii) that is available for a large number of banks. In view of the ongoing securitization of the banking industries, bank loans and deposits are increasingly biased measures of banks' activities. Moreover, banks' asset values are book values which might be affected by differences in accounting practices.
Hence, we use operating income (which comprises interest income and non-interest income) as our sales proxy.
Furthermore, we have to determine the number of banks used to calculate the shocks. Gabaix (2005) uses the largest 100 firms in the economy. However, we cannot use the largest 100 banks in the economy to calculate the shocks. Though the banking sector is relatively large, it is much smaller than the industrial sector, which Gabaix (2005) uses. Therefore, we use the 10 largest banks.
We calculate the Banking Granular Residual according to equation (4), where is operating income of bank i at time t, and is the growth rate of equity for bank i at time
ε represents a shock, i.e. the deviation of the growth rate of equity at time t from its mean growth rate. Therefore, the numerator in the above equation gives a measure for the weighted output shocks of the 10 largest banks. In contrast to Gabaix (2005) , we use the operating income of all banks in the denominator, not just the largest ones. Since we want to look at the effect of the 10 largest banks on all banks, this seems to be the appropriate definition.
Data and Stylized Facts
Our main aim in this paper is to analyze the impact of shocks at large banks on the probability distress of small and mid-sized banks in Germany. The bank-level data that we use comes from two bank-level data sources -the confidential database on banks' distress provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank as well as Bankscope. In this section, we describe the data on distress events that we use, and we present descriptive statistics on the Granular Residual of German banks.
Data on Banks' Distress
We use data on distress events among German banks between 1995 and 2004 and order these events according to the classification proposed by Kick and Koetter (2007) Finally, the worst distress category ("Distress Category IV") comprises all events that reflect the disappearance of a bank from active business operations given by the closure of a bank or restructuring mergers. See Kick and Koetter (2007) for a more detailed description of the categorization of different distress events.
Data on the Banking Granular Residual
To construct our measure for idiosyncratic shocks to large banks, our main data source is
Bankscope. From Bankscope, we retrieve data for all German banks from 1991-2005.
We clean the data in the following way:
Some banks present both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts. In order to eliminate double entries, we keep only those banks with the consolidation codes C1
(unconsolidated and companion is not on the disc), C2 (unconsolidated and companion is on the disc), U1 (consolidated and companion is not on the disc or if the bank does not publish consolidated accounts), and A1 (companion is not on disk). Our final sample contains more than 2,000 banks. Furthermore, we eliminate all entries with missing total assets because we need to order the banks by size for determining the 10 largest ones.
We split the banks into subgroups, according to their banking group. Bankscope offers two different ways of doing this, using a general specification or a country-specific specification. For our purpose, the country-specific specialization proves to be more accurate. We create the following groups of banks: 1. all banks (2,656), 2. all banks 
The Stress-Testing Framework
The micro-level part of the empirical model describes the relationship between individual banks' probabilities of distress, given by the frequency of distress events, and their structural characteristics as well as macroeconomic aggregates. The impact of bankspecifc covariates, which reflect CAMEL characteristics (an acronym for capitalization, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity) as well as macroeconomic variables on the probabilities of distress is analyzed using a logit estimation. As in De Graeve at al.
(2007), our bank-specific variables are the equity ratio, total reserves, customer loans, off-balance sheet activities, size, return on equity and liquidity, which are described in more detail in the Appendix. Given the micro-and the macro-part of the model, both building blocks are combined into an integrated micro-macro approach that allows for simultaneous feedback effects from the macroeconomy to the financial sector, and vice versa. Hence, the macro-VAR is extended by the estimated probabilities of distress as an additional endogenous variable of the system.
One shortcoming of the original approach by De Graeve et al. (2007) is that, during the time period under study, distress events have been observed for small and mid-sized banks in Germany only. Including a measure for the idiosyncratic shocks of large banks allows taking potential spillover effects from large banks to smaller ones into account (i.e. a micro-micro link), and to model another potential link from the micro-to the macro-level. The focus of this paper is on modeling the micro-micro link. In the following section, we present a number of alternative specifications showing how shocks at large banks affect the probability of distress of smaller banks. At the end of this section, we will also check whether the feedback effects between the micro-and the macro-economy change if this new micro-micro link is taken into account.
The Granular Residual and Banking Distress
The key regression equation at the micro-level explains the probability that a bank will experience a distress event using bank-level and macro-level explanatory variables. This equation is estimated using a logit model. To show the impact of idiosyncratic shocks at large banks, we include the Granular Residual at the micro-level to estimate the probability, PD, that bank i will experience a distress event at time t: 
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Empirical results for our baseline regressions are reported in Table 1 . In Column (1), we report results including bank-specific and macroeconomic variables only. In Column (2), we add a measure for idiosyncratic shock at large banks, the Banking Granular Residual.
In Columns (3)-(6), we show results for the different distress categories described above.
Our set of explanatory variables includes variables measured at the bank-level and at the aggregated, macro-level. Starting with the bank-level, micro-variables first, we would expect the variables reflecting the capitalization of a bank, the equity ratio and total reserves, to exert a negative influence on banks' probability of distress. Higher customer 18 loans increase the exposure to credit risk and should have a positive impact. We also include banks' other off-balance sheet activities, which banks could use to hedge against these risks. The ability to buffer shocks, i.e. the size of a bank, as well as profitability, measured by total assets and return on equity, respectively, should lower the probability of a distress event. The impact of liquidity, measured as cash and short-term net interbank assets to total assets, on the distress frequency is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher liquidity cushions liquidity risk, but, on the other hand, it also signals high opportunity costs due to missed interest-bearing investments, thus indicating lower profitability. Our empirical results presented in Table 1 show that the 'signaling' effect dominates -having a high liquidity increases the probability that German banks experience a distress event.
The remaining bank-specific covariates are significant and have the expected sign. The only exceptions are off-balance sheet activities, which are insignificant. These, as well as the following results for the macro-variables, largely confirm De Graeve et al. (2007) .
Turning next to the variables measuring macroeconomic, aggregate effects, we include short-term interest rates, inflation, and GDP growth. We expect higher GDP growth to have a negative and higher real interest rates to have a positive impact on the probability that banks experience a distress event. Hence, the impact of short-term nominal interest rates should be positive and the impact of the inflation rate should be negative. Our results confirm this. However, the negative impact of interest rates is not always significant.
Our main variable of interest, the Banking Granular Residual, should have a negative impact on the number of distressed events. Positive shocks to large banks should positively affect the financial stance of small and mid-sized banks and thus reduce the probability of distress. In fact, results in Columns (2)-(6) show that the Granular Residual is highly significant and, as expected, negative. Moreover, comparing Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1 shows that the remaining results including and excluding the Granular Residual are not only qualitatively the same but also quantitatively very similar. We observe a difference only in the estimated coefficient for the interest rate which is insignificant, as well as in the overall fit of the model as the value of the adjusted R 2 slightly increases when the Banking Granular Residual is included. We conclude that idiosyncratic shocks to large banks have additional explanatory power for the probability of distress.
Shocks at the aggregated level -such as shocks affecting large banks and/or macroeconomic shocks -are likely to affect different distress categories differently. A relatively modest violation of regulatory norms, for instance, as a consequence of adverse aggregated developments may be compensated by a competent bank management team.
Supervisors may realize this and, hence, harsher sanctions would be unlikely. Measures by the financial supervisor, in contrast, are unlikely to be affected by macroeconomic shocks alone but are likely to be the result of bank-specific, idiosyncratic factors. Hence, we would expect a relatively larger impact of macroeconomic, aggregate developments on weaker distress events.
If we restrict our measure for distress only to those events characterized by mandatory automatic signals by individual banks (Distress Category I, Column (3) of Table 1), the Granular Residual and the macroeconomic aggregates in this regression are still significant. In contrast, liquidity is significant only at the 10%-level, and the equity ratio becomes insignificant. This result is interesting in its own right since it could be argued 20 that some bank-level variables are significant because they could be endogenous to one of the distress events. Endogeneity could be a concern if, for instance, distress events are triggered by equity capital falling below a certain threshold. In fact, the first distress category also comprises reports by individual banks if there is a significant drop in the bank's equity. This result overrules a potential objection of endogeneity. If there are official warnings by the financial supervisor (Distress Category II, Column (4) of Table 1 ), size and the interest rate loose explanatory power, while off-balance sheets activities are now slightly significant (at the 10 % level). Distress events in terms of concrete interventions by the financial supervisor, as captured by Distress Category III (Column (5) of Table 1) , cannot be explained by macroeconomic developments. Neither the macroeconomic variables nor the Granular Residual are significant. If mergers and acquisitions were solely initiated by the financial supervisor and head institution of the respective banking group, we would expect little explanatory power of macroeconomic variables to hold for Distress Category IV (Column (6) of Table 1 ). However, only GDP growth is insignificant, whereas inflation, the interest rate, and the Granular Residual are not. Hence, the timing of distress-related mergers and acquisitions depends on the macroeconomic environment. As regards the bank-specific covariates, only liquidity (again in addition to off-balance sheets activities) is not significantly different from zero.
In Table 2 , we explore the impact of shocks to large banks on different banking groups.
We split up the sample according to Germany's three banking pillars: commercial banks, savings banks, and cooperatives. For the commercial banks (Column (3) of Table 2 ), we have only 1,662 observations. It turns out that most of the estimates are insignificant, and the adjusted R² is only 4%. Only total reserves and return on equity are significant in 21 addition to inflation and interest rates. Even though the coefficients of most variables, including that of the Granular Residual, are insignificant in the specification for the savings banks as well (Column (5) of Table 2), the adjusted R² increases to 19%.
Moreover, total reserves, customer loans, return on equity, liquidity, and inflation are now significant at the 1%-level. Finally, turning to the cooperative banks (Column (4) of Table 2 ) we find qualitatively the same results compared to the baseline specification with the Granular Residual (Column (2) of Table 2 ). This banking group with about 20,000 bank-year observations dominates and drives the results for the full sample. The only exception is the interest rate, which is insignificant. Note that the Granular Residual is significant only for the cooperative banking group.
Robustness
We check the robustness of our results in different ways. First, we construct the Granular Residual with different shock variables and examine whether the qualitative results still hold. Second, we use different estimation methods to check whether the pooled logit estimation yields stable results. Third, we study whether banks' exposures to the interbank market affect the impact of shocks at large banks on bank distress. Fourth, we test whether positive and negative shocks to large banks have different effects. Fifth, we substitute the nominal interest rate with the real interest rate. Finally, we compute idiosyncratic shocks of large banks for every banking group separately.
Different Granular Residuals:
The descriptive statistics in Section 2.3 have shown that the time trends differ for different calculations of the Granular Residual. Hence, we replace our Granular Residual from the baseline specification with alternative measures 22 to check the robustness of our results. Our sales measure remains unchanged, but we alter the shock variable to liquid assets, profit before tax, and loans, respectively. The results are presented in Table 3 . Results for the micro variables are very stable. By and large, this holds true also for the macro variables. The only variable that changes in significance is the interest rate, though this could already be observed when adding our original Granular
Residual to the baseline specification. When looking at the different versions of the Granular Residual, we see that it remains significant and negative for all specifications, but the impact varies in magnitude. The Granular Residual that is constructed with equity as the shock variable has the strongest impact. However, this should not be surprising, since in times of distress, equity should be among the first and the strongest indicators to react. A similar reasoning applies to loans. Summing up, one can say that the qualitative results of our analysis remain almost entirely unchanged. Estimation method: As described above, our main empirical model uses a pooled logit regression. One might argue that one looses information by not taking the panel structure of our dataset properly into account. Therefore, we re-estimate our model using different panel data models. Results are presented in Table 4 . First of all, we employ a panel logit with random effects. Our results from the pooled logit remain unchanged. The only difference to be noticed is that the significance of bank size vanishes as it is being picked up by the fixed effects. However, the respective coefficient remains negative and of comparable magnitude. In a next step, we take into account that our dataset could be regarded as being of a hierarchical structure. This argument might be justified because we look at the distress of banks over time. One could regard each bank as a kind of cluster because observations for one bank over time might exhibit smaller variance than 23 observations between different banks at the same point in time. For example, it might be plausible to assume that observations for Commerzbank over time exhibit smaller variance than observations for Commerzbank with other banks. When this is indeed the case, neglecting this structure and estimating with a standard pooled logit might result in standard errors that are too low. This could lead to significant regression coefficient where in reality they are insignificant. Therefore, we also employ a multilevel logit model. For an overview of multilevel models for discrete response data, see Goldstein (2002) . Results remain more or less unchanged, the only difference again being our measure of bank size which is insignificant, but remains negative and of comparable magnitude. In a next step, we go back to our original estimation method, but we incorporate standard errors that are clustered across years. This could be seen as meeting concerns about not incorporating time fixed effects as these would be collinear with the macroeconomic variables included in our model. Again, we do not find any significant changes in our qualitative results. The same also holds true when clustering at the bank level. In sum, we see that the pooled logit estimation is very robust.
Interbank propagation channels:
The concept of the Granular Residual is a-theoretical in the sense that idiosyncratic shocks to large players on aggregate outcomes do not depend on specific assumptions on linkages between (banking) firms. Accounting for such linkages may even aggravate the impact of large shocks. The obvious linkage mechanism on banking markets is the interbank market. Through holdings of inter-bank assets and liabilities, shocks to individual banks may be dissipated or enforced, depending on the precise network of interbank linkages. Lacking detailed, bank-by-bank data on interbank linkages, we test this channel using bank-level information on the 24 importance of (aggregate) interbank linkages as a proxy. More specifically, when estimating our bank-level distress equation, we interact the Granular Residual with a bank-specific measure of banks' interbank assets and liabilities. Columns (2) to (4) of Table 5 present our estimation results when including information on interbank linkages into our baseline regression without interaction terms. When adding interbank assets, interbank liabilities and the sum of both in step, our previous results remain remarkably stable (see Column (1) of Table 5 ). Higher interbank assets siginificantly decrease the individual probability of distress (at the 5%-level), whereas interbank liabilities and the sum of interbank assets and liabilities are insignificant. This picture persists when interaction of the three interbank market variables with the Granular Residual is taken into account. Non-interacted interbank assets are negative and weakly significant (at the 10%-level), whereas the interacted term is insignificant (Columns (5) of Table 5 ). The coefficients for the (non-interacted) interbank liabilities and interbank assets plus liabilities remain insignificant, but the coefficients of the interaction terms are positive and significant at the 1%-and 5%-level, respectively (Columns (6) and (7) of Table 5 ).
Moreover, in both cases, the value of the coefficients of the Granular Residual increases in absolute terms. However, the change in these coefficients should be interpreted with caution, because the impact of the idiosyncratic shocks to large banks is also captured by the interaction term. In addition, as pointed out by Ai and Norton (2003) , the marginal effect of the interacted term in nonlinear models cannot be interpreted as an interaction effect per se since both may differ in sign as well as statistical significance. To evaluate the impact of the interacted variables correctly, calculations of the magnitude and statistical significance of the interaction effect must be based on cross derivatives. Since 25 our results indicate that allowing for interbank linkages captures an important additional channel for the propagation of shocks from large to small and medium-scale banks, we leave this issue for further research.
Positive versus negative shocks:
As a next robustness test, we check whether the impact of shocks at large banks on the banking system depends on the nature of these shocks.
That is, we compute a Granular Residual for contractions and expansions separately. In unreported regressions, we find that positive idiosyncratic shocks to large banks exhibit a highly significant negative influence on the individual probability of distress. The impact of the other explanatory variables is virtually unchanged. When restricting the sample to negative values of the Granular Residual, we find, somewhat surprisingly, a positive coefficient which is positive and significant at the 10%-level, indicating that negative idiosyncratic shocks to large banks lower the probability of distress. In addition, inflation and the interest rate are insignificant in this specification. To further investigate the asymmetric effects of the idiosyncratic shocks on banks' probability of distress, we interact the Granular Residual with a dummy variable which takes the value one if the Granular Residual is negative and zero otherwise. Again, the interpretation of the interaction effects is not straightforward, since it cannot be based on the coefficients of the interacted terms alone.
Real interest rates:
To take account of possible collinearity between the nominal interest rate and inflation, we substitute these two variables by the real interest rate. The real interest rate enters significantly and is positive. This is as expected and confirms the above results. A higher real interest rate increases the probability that banks experience a distress event.
Granular Residual computed for the respective banking group: We also construct the Granular Residual for the different banking categories. We find that it is negative for all categories, except for savings banks. There it is positive, but insignificant. Furthermore, the significance for commercial banks and cooperative banks vanishes.
Effects on the Macro-Economy: VAR Estimation
So far, we have shown that idiosyncratic shocks at large banks affect the probability of distress of smaller and mid-sized banks. But does this also affect the link between the micro-and the macro-level? We answer this question by investigating the sensitivity of the VAR model to including the Granular Residual at the micro-level.
At the aggregate level, a VAR is estimated that comprises a system of the three macroeconomic variables: GDP growth, inflation, and the interest rate. To analyze the impact of the financial sector on the macroeconomic aggregates, the probability of bankdistress is added as an exogenous variable. However, given the short time interval of ten years, for which the distress indicator is available at an annual frequency, an alternative indicator is created instead. This indicator relies on subset databases which cover only about 75% of all events. These data allow for the construction of a quarterly distress series that can be seen as an approximation of the annual distress frequency.
In the combined model that links the micro-to the macro-level and that allows for feedback effects from the macro-to the micro-level, the VAR is extended by the estimated probabilities of distress as an additional endogenous variable of the system. Hence, the marginal effects of the macroeconomic variables on the frequency of distress events obtained from the micro estimation are included to take the potential impact from the macroeconomic aggregates on the financial sector into account. However, since the events of distress are observed at a lower frequency than the macroeconomic variables, the VAR has to be rewritten in annual form to combine the micro and the macro part into a unifying framework as proposed by De Graeve et al. (2007) . The integrated framework can be written as:
where PD is the aggregate probability of distress and , again, is the vector of macroeconomic variables. The parameter vectors and capture the impact on the macro level and on the financial stance of the economy, respectively.
Having established an extended micro-macro system, we analyze how a monetary policy shock affects the system. The identification of this shock is done using sign restrictions as proposed by Uhlig (2005) . This allows remaining agnostic with respect to the response of the financial sector. As De Graeve et al. (2007), we model a monetary policy shock via a positive interest rate shock, and we restrict GDP growth and inflation to react negatively to a positive interest rate shock during the first year.
The top panel (a) of Figure 4 shows the response of the system to a one standard deviation shock to the interest rate without the Granular Residual. Real GDP grows negatively and gradually reverts to its original level. As imposed by the sign restriction, inflation is negative during the first year and slightly positive in subsequent periods before it takes its original value. Although its response is not significant during the first year, the aggregate probability of distress reacts positively to a tightening monetary environment and gradually reverts to its original level as well. However, if the Granular
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Residual is used as an additional explanatory variable to estimate the probability of distress, this pattern changes. The bottom panel (b) of Figure 4 shows the response of the system including the Granular Residual to a restrictive monetary policy shock. Although there is virtually no change in the reaction of the macroeconomic variables, the response of the probability of distress is far from being significant. One reason for this behavior might be that the inclusion of the Granular Residual at the micro-level estimation already captures a link from the macro-to the micro-level that leaves the reaction of the aggregate financial stance of the economy to a change in the monetary condition in the combined model unaffected.
Conclusions
During episodes of financial crises and financial instability, adverse shocks to large financial institutions can have an impact on the soundness of the banking system. These shocks can affect aggregated banking sector outcomes, and they can affect the probability of distress of small and mid-sized banks. In this paper, we have mainly explored the second aspect. More specifically, we have asked whether shocks originating at large banks affect the probability of distress of smaller banks in Germany.
To answer this question, we have drawn information from different micro-databases of the German banking system, and we have analyzed the propagation of shocks between small and large banks both from a micro-and from a macro-economic perspective. Our data for distress events at German banks come from the distress database provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. Information on large banks which we use to compute the Banking Granular Residual comes from Bankscope. Following Gabaix (2005) , we have computed a Granular Residual as a proxy for idiosyncratic shocks at large German banks.
Our analysis has three main findings.
First, the size distribution of German banks is uneven, and the banking market is dominated by a few large players. Shocks originating at these banks have a significant impact on the whole German banking sector.
Second, negative shock hitting large banks have a significant impact on the probability of Results of this paper also have a number of potentially important policy implications.
They suggest, first of all, that links between macro-economic developments and the probability of distress of individual banks may be driven by idiosyncratic developments 30 at large financial institutions. This micro-micro link could be a useful building block of empirical stress-testing models. Moreover, the importance of this micro-micro channel of shock propagation does not necessarily require propagation through the interbank market.
Yet, preliminary results show that the exposure to the Granular Residual is dampened if banks have a large exposure to the interbank market. This result emphasizes the role of the interbank market as a channel for the diversification of shocks across banks.
While we provide a substantial body of evidence checking the robustness of our results, it would be interesting to check the nature of the propagation of shocks between banks of different size. For this, it would be particularly interesting to directly explore the linkages and risk exposures between different banks. Also, it would be interesting to check whether the propagation of shocks between different banks is driven by similarities in the business models that these banks follow.
Data on Banking Distress
To measure the soundness of the German banking sector, we use confidential information from the distress database of the Deutsche Bundesbank for individual banks at an annual frequency for the period from 1995 to 2004. These data allow for a distinction between different distress categories that differ in terms of severity of distress observed, see the main text and Kick and Koetter (2007) for a more detailed description of the different distress categories.
Data on Bank-Level Covariates
Information on individual bank balance sheets comes from data collected by the Deutsche Bundesbank. These bank-level data are constructed as in De Graeve et al. (2007) . We use core capital to risk-weighted assets (equity ratio), total reserves to total assets, customer loans to total assets, off-balance sheet activities to total assets, log of total assets (size), return on equity, and finally, cash and short-term net interbank assets to total assets (liquidity), total interbank assets and liabilities to total assets.
Macroeconomic Data
All macroeconomic data are at a quarterly frequency as provided by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy and published by the Statistisches Bundesamt (Fachserie 18: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung, Reihe 1.2) and the Deutsche Bundesbank:
-growth in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP): constructed as percent change using seasonally adjusted data on GDP (in billion Euros) in chained constant prices (with base year 2000), -inflation: calculated as the percentage change in the price index represented by the GDP deflator, -short-term interest rate: average money market rate given by FIBOR (prior to 1999) and EURIBOR (after 1999) on three-months funds. .
Table A1: Data Used to Compute the Banking Granular Residual
To compute the Banking Granular Residual, we use data taken from the Bankscope database as provided by Bureau van Dijk. We use total assets, equity, operating income, liquid assets, profits before tax, and loans. All variables are on a yearly basis and in million. 
Figure 2: The Granular Residual Using Alternative Shock-Variables
This figure plots the Granular Residual for different shock-variables. In the baseline specification, upper left hand graph, equity is used to construct idiosyncratic shocks. Equity is then substituted by liquid assets, profit before tax, and loans, respectively to examine if different shocks result in different Granular Residuals.
- (1)), with the Granular Residual (Column (2)), and for four different distress categories defined in the main text (Columns (3) to (4)). All variables are in percent except size (which is given in logs). GR = Granular Residual, ***, **, and * denote significance at a 1%-, 5%-, and 1%-level, respectively.
(1) Table reports estimated coefficients if the sample is split into commercial (Column (2)), cooperative (Column (3)), and savings banks (Column (5)).
(1) Table reports estimated coefficients if the Granular Residual is constructed using equity (Column (2), liquid assets (Column(3), pre-tax profits (Column (4)), and loans (Column (5)) as measures for idiosyncratic shocks as described in section 2.3.
(1) 
